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1. Introduction 
I agreed to write a review of Balaban, Ebcioglu and Laske’s Understanding 
Music with AZ some time before the book was in print, and without being told 
what the final title of the volume would be. I was dismayed when the book 
arrived: the only word in the title of which I could claim really to have a clear 
definition in context was “with”. I make this point to illustrate the enormous 
problem the editors faced in compiling an anthology of this kind. They have, 
laudably, tried to address a real need to pin down what has been so far an eclectic 
and ill-defined field. That field is often underestimated in its potential contribu- 
tion to our understanding of the human mind, quite apart from the benefits so far 
only beginning to be realised in the artistic world. 
If the book were intended to do nothing more than give a wide-ranging survey 
of “Music with AI” (which is one possible reading of the title) then it would 
certainly succeed4emonstrating nicely the diversity of approach and viewpoint 
in several different aspects of this infant field. However, it would be disappointing 
if the editors restricted themselves to such limited ambitions, and, indeed, we are 
told that this was not the intention. Regrettably, the book is not always so 
successful at answering the other questions begged by its richly ambiguous title, 
especially when we consider the subtitle, “Perspectives on Cognitive Musicolo- 
gy”, as only about half of the papers are about cognitive issues in any real sense. 
Indeed, it is probably best to try to give at least some loose definition of what I 
mean by these terms before I go any further. By “AI and Music” or “Musical AI” 
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I mean music-related artificial intelligence work. in the broadest sense. Thus, for 
example, I class a discussion of issues in representation for musical knowledge to 
be Musical AI; similarly, I would consider a program capable of significant 
(whatever that means) composition to be an AI artifact. On the other hand, by 
“Cognitive Musicology” I mean the study of (human) thought processes relating 
to and arising from music; in this context. the study will be (at least theoretically) 
computational. An example of this kind of thing might be the attempt to study 
rhythm perception by computational modelling of a cognitive theory. Of course, it 
is perfectly possible for a piece of work to fit into both classes-a psychologically 
motivated knowledge representation scheme, for example, or a composer pro- 
gram which could be said to compose in a human-like way. 
It is regrettable that there is not space here to review all of the papers in the 
volume in detail, since there is a huge variety of subject matter, approach, and 
style. To some extent, then, I must tar the different chapters with the same broad 
brush, which makes it difficult to give all the authors their due-certainly, no 
slight is intended on those not explicitly covered here. Before moving on to the 
technical content, however, I must comment on the general edition, and on the 
Foreword. 
2. The edition 
I regret to say that this book is the most flawed edition I have ever come across. 
While it is not clear under whose aegis this has come about, there has plainly been 
some considerable laxity in the proof-reading, and errors of some importance 
have crept in. Anyone who has edited a book, will know that is impossible to 
avoid errors completely. but this really goes too far. For example, in Bernard 
Bel’s excellent paper on sound-object (or rather “sond-object” as it is misspelled 
in the running header) representation, formulae appear, containing both the 
numeral “1” and the lower case of the letter “L”; in the typeface chosen for the 
book, the two characters are indistinguishable. There are frequent spelling and 
grammatical errors: in one of Laske’s own papers, which has, I assume, been 
translated from the German, there are at least two German words. One paper has 
all its examples reproduced twice. Probably the most irritating point is a paper 
where every single one of a number of figures is a page or two after the 
corresponding commentary, making it hard to concentrate because of continual 
leafing back and forth. The point of having editors for a volume of this kind is 
that they are responsible for checking such things-therwise, why not simply 
collect the papers directly from the authors and print them as such? I hope other 
readers will not find this sloppy shoddiness as irritating and distracting as I did. 
On the other side of the editorial coin, I found myself wondering why someone 
would go to the trouble of constructing a section overview for each main subject 
heading covered in the book, when these overviews are synthesised almost 
entirely-and repetitiously-from the abstracts and introductions printed at the 
beginning of each paper. It turns out that nearly four per cent of the book is taken 
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up with these overviews, which is a waste of paper and possibly (depending on the 
MIT Press’ pricing policy) of readers’ money. 
The papers in the volume are divided into seven sections, entitled as follows: 
“Two Views on Cognitive Musicology”; “General Problems in Modeling Music 
Activities”; “Music Composition”; “Analysis”; “Performance”; “Perception”; 
and “Learning and Tutoring”. As elsewhere, I found myself wondering why the 
editors had chosen these titles, since they do not always represent their sections’ 
content. For example, the “General Problems” section is essentially about 
representation; the “Analysis” section contains a report on an expert system for 
generating Bach-like chorale harmony; the “Performance” section contains a 
paper which is about performance only in as far as its empirical data is taken 
from, and its results verified by, real performers; a paper in the “Perception” 
section does not even mention the word, but is about representation in con- 
nectionist networks. This is confusing and irritating, especially if one is using the 
book for reference, since one cannot be sure of the content of the papers from the 
headings. 
All in all, I feel that the editors have done the authors (including themselves) a 
disservice by allowing the volume to be printed in this bug-ridden and compro- 
mised form. 
3. The foreword 
On now to the foreword of Understanding Music with AZ, which is a transcribed 
conversation between Otto Laske and Marvin Minsky. (The claim, on the back 
cover of the book, that the forward is “by” Minsky is, in my opinion, misleading.) 
Therefore, it does not constitute a technical paper and should certainly not be 
read as such. Nevertheless, it is of sufficient length (21 pages), and it contains 
material of sufficient import, to warrant detailed coverage here. Minsky is a great 
proponent of the study of AI and Music-by which he means (as I understand this 
article) the use of AI techniques to emulate some aspects of human musical 
behaviour. The Foreword is divided into a number of short sections, each 
touching on a different subject. I found myself rather frustrated by this form, 
since most of the issues raised did not get the discussion they deserved-I would 
prefer a deeper and less broad coverage of Minsky’s ideas, which constitute an 
interesting and sometimes idiosyncratic view of the world. There is no doubt in 
my mind that both Minsky and Laske have thought through the material in great 
detail-but that detail is not generally explicit in this Foreword, and this often left 
me wondering why claims were made. 
We start with a plug for Minsky’s sci-fi novel, [4] co-authored with Harry 
Harrison, which, entertaining and whimsical though it may be, has little or 
nothing to do with musical AI. The running theme of the next few sections is the 
notion of formalization of music, and Minsky asks the important question “Is 
formalizing the right idea ?” [pp. x.ff]. He goes on to suggest that attempts to 
formalize in a (computational inguistics-style) representation based on traditional 
logic are misguided, though the implicit assumption is that there is some 
information deeper than structure, and more like the “semantics” of linguistics- 
an issue which I touch on further below. 
Minsky’s view is that the action of applying AI to Music “would be making 
composers, or at least listeners”, which “would have to know when to say ‘oh, 
this is exciting’ or ‘oh, how very tender’ and the like” [pp. xviii.ff]. The “listening 
machine would have to understand the music well enough to recognise . . which 
problems have been solved and which remain open”. This is where I begin to 
have trouble with the discussion. We are not told what “understanding music” 
means; we are not told why we should want to perform this listener construction 
task or how even to begin it-and I do not feel that the answers to these questions 
are obvious enough to be assumed. The immensely important and difficult issue of 
feeling, as opposed to knowing, is not acknowledged at this stage. This seems to 
discount interesting areas, such as the cognitive side, in that Minsky’s goal seems 
to be only the construction itself. not the construction process and the knowledge 
gained therefrom-or maybe this is to be taken as axiomatic. But the main 
problem is the complete lack of acknowledgement that there even exists a 
question of definition and mutual understanding in this field. In similar vein, the 
implicit assumption that there is a “correct” analysis of any given piece of music 
against which to judge the output of such a system is highly questionable. 
Minsky’s paper, [3]. is a better source for these ideas. 
Later on in the discussion. when Minsky does address the idea of “emotion”, 
he suggests that maybe emotions are hard to understand not because they are 
complicated but because they are simple. He points out that hunger is a direct 
result of chemical processes in the brain stem. For myself, I find it hard to 
swallow the idea that emotional response to music is comparable to a basic 
survival mechanism, if only because I have seen no evidence that such a response 
is indeed hard-wired into organisms. However, there is evidence that musical 
appreciation, beyond the level of basic rhythm and tonal harmony, is to some 
degree learned, or at least assimilated, and that brain activity involved in listening 
to music happens in the “higher” areas, on both sides of the brain. Minsky sees as 
false the “commonsense distinction between ‘intellect’ and ‘emotion’ ” [p. xx]; 
again, I am surprised to read this, in the face of the existing neuro- and 
psychological evidence to the contrary. 
In my opinion, the most interesting and contentious point is Minsky’s analogy 
between musical compositions and discourse in human language. This is not a new 
idea (The Orchestra, Theocritus (c. 600BC): “The/ theme is difficult/ but no 
more difficult/ than the fact to be/ resolved”); and while a detailed discussion 
would surely be of interest, we have instead a sweeping assumption, the validity 
of which is far from obvious. There is a problem of ill- or non-definition: the 
process of “understanding” music is implicitly strongly equated with the under- 
standing of language, a quite different entity-but a context where we do know 
pretty much what we mean by “understanding”. How much then of the 
understanding of stories (e.g. real-world knowledge; reference; discourse struc- 
ture; character motivation; and, most importantly, meaning) are we expected to 
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import into the allegedly analogous music “understanding”? We are left to guess. 
This is compounded into a discussion of the idea of a Cyc-style “commonsense” 
database for music. Again, we see an assumption that there are absolutes which 
can be written down and used to make “inferences” in musical context, without 
any argument for such a claim. 
There is no doubt that the thoughts of a researcher of Minsky’s stature are 
interesting; but, in this context, the impression given, correctly or otherwise, is 
that many of the same mistakes are being made again at the establishment of this 
new subfield as were made at the inception of AI (and, no doubt, other fields). AI 
researchers are still, decades on, trying to live down the nai’ve and/or overly 
optimistic projections of some of their subject’s pioneers. In the context of an 
archival scientific publication, this feeling of ill-definition, lack of precision and 
over-ambition is regrettable in the extreme. 
4. The technical papers 
4.1. Introduction 
Rather than try to cover all the papers in the volume at a high level, I will, in 
this section, pick on some particular issues raised, in terms of both technical 
content and presentation, and cover those in rather more detail. 
4.2. Abstraction and knowledge representation for music 
There are several papers in Understanding Music with AI which are about 
representation. The “General Problems” section, as I said above, is primarily 
about that subject, and the section on “Perception” also has three papers in which 
representation is fundamental. 
“Representing Listening Behavior”, by Stephen Smoliar, discusses the issue of 
abstraction in representation in very general terms, not just of data but of 
problems themselves. This, Smoliar says, was recognised to be important in 
computer science more than two decades ago, but is underemphasised in the 
reality of the (music) research world. The central claim is that, in attempting to 
study music cognition, researchers have often tended to make less than ideal 
abstractions, the abstraction being driven by representation, rather than the other 
way round. In particular, there have been many attempts to reduce “musical 
meaning” to a computational linguistics-style propositional representation, to 
which, Smoliar says, it is ill-suited. He proposes three ways in which a Minskyan 
“Society of Mind” style of approach to modelling listening behaviour might be 
made to work, given fundamental notions of sensation and memory. The first is to 
suppose that listening behaviour is just a matter of building structures based on 
what one hears; the second is that we listen in a context supplied by what we have 
heard before; and the third is that memories of music experiences for associations 
with other kinds of memory, maybe inducing emotional states as a result. This 
comes at the end of a wide ranging argument, beginning with the idea of 
abstraction itself, and moving through proposals as to the constitution of “musical 
objects”. arguing, in particular, that the necessary abstraction to allow repre- 
sentation of musical memory is procedural rather than declarative. The discussion 
ends, regrettably, with a fairly high level account of Smoliar’s three espoused 
possible approaches. I would have been interested to read more on his conclu- 
sions; but he does not discuss the detailed exploration of the consequences of his 
approach. More on this argument can be found in [6]. 
“Symbolic and Sonic Representations of Sound Object Structures”, by Bernard 
Bel, is a more specific description of a “sound-object” representation language 
designed for use in the Bol Processor, described elsewhere in the volume. The 
representation is specifically designed for rendering into a real-time control 
system to play a synthesiser. and, as such, is not as abstract as one might like. 
However, in conjunction with Bel and Jim Kippen’s report on Bol Processor 
grammars, this paper serves to give a picture at several levels of what has been a 
significant piece of extended empirical work. 
In their second paper, Be1 and Kippen report on a description of Indian tabla 
music. specifically in the qa’ida improvisation form. The description used for the 
Bol Processor system (bols are vocal sounds used to name the different strokes 
available on the tabla) is in terms of a phrase structure grammar. However, things 
are not so simple, because of the essential differences, which I touch upon below, 
between music and language. Be1 and Kippen note that structure of qa’ida is less 
akin to language in general than to poetry, in that structural features such as 
repetition and variation are fundamentally significant. 
The grammar needed to describe qa’ida is of Chomsky Type O-so membership 
of the language by any given string need not be decidable. This creates problems: 
Be1 and Kippen wish to be able to parse their data in order to infer grammars 
from it. Also, they wish to be able to generate variations according to that 
grammar, on a portable g-bit microcomputer (the technological cutting edge at 
the time!). The solution to the generation problem is the part of the paper which 
is to my mind the most interesting. Be1 and Kippen have borrowed ideas from 
pattern grammars, a class of languages identified in [l]. This has allowed them to 
embellish their grammars with annotations detailing relationships between the 
values of variable symbols. For example, given strings can be marked as identical, 
so they may be generated only once. Isomorphisms other than identity may be 
similarly annotated. 
By means of these and similar devices. Be1 and Kippen reduce the computa- 
tional problem of parsing and generating in a type 0 language to a tractable, 
specialised level. The approach is not so application-dependent as to make it 
useless elsewhere. The generality afforded by the use of generative grammar as 
the basis of the representation means that the same ideas can be used in any 
formal language with comparable behaviour and search control problems. 
The motivation of Mira Balaban’s “Music Structures: Interleaving the 
Temporal and Hierarchical Aspects in Music” is not dissimilar to Bel’s, though 
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Balaban is making a more explicit effort to be general. Her proposal is based 
on the principle that time is the fundamental defining dimension of music, and 
that other musical structures (Balaban’s examples are mostly notes, but other 
possibilities are available) must be specified in relation to it. The system comes 
with operators for defining relationships between musical structures and their 
individual relationships with time, which is modelled by the real line, the 
primary operator being a “timestamp” which allows a start time to be 
associated with a given musical structure. Structures can be joined together 
with a “musical concatenation” operator, which behaves like the set insertion 
operator. Most importantly, musical structures can also be collections of other 
structures joined together by the concatenation operators, so a hierarchical 
structure can be built up. Since musical structures can appear more than once 
in the representation of a given musical object, relationships within objects can 
be represented. This is a fundamental feature required of any music 
representation. 
The proposal yields a very powerful and expressive representation which is, 
nevertheless, to my mind, marred in two rather important respects. First, the 
bottom level musical structures themselves are undefined; so the power of the 
system is limited to the expression of hierarchy. Conversely, the time dimension is 
strictly defined to be the real line. In both cases, I would like to see an explicit 
abstraction (see my comments on Smoliar’s paper), so that the system might be 
made more transparent o the musician who is using it. Second, my feeling is that 
the system is rather more complicated than is necessary, in that the tendency is to 
supply (or allow the definition of) a new operator to express every possible 
relationship. A better approach might be to supply a (well-known) specification 
language (e.g. a decidable first order logic) in which the relationships might be 
directly and declaratively annotated. This could give the same expressive power, 
while making the representation much more readable and inferences from it more 
uniform. 
“Motivations, Source, and Initial Design Ideas for CALM: A Composition 
Analysis/ Generation Language for Music”, by Eli Blevis, Michael Jenkins and 
Janice Glasgow, is a short position paper on the authors’ approach to the design 
of a music programming language, a primary feature being a strong type system. 
The emphasis in the design is on musically intuitive high-level structures, which 
are expressed through the strong typing. The typing allows data to be combined in 
musically convenient ways through what are known as “polymorphic constructor 
operations”, specifying which elements of the tuple defining a musical event can 
be combined in what circumstances. Here, we begin to see some steps toward the 
kind of abstraction we need for music representation; though I am not sure quite 
how far it goes. Also, there is a clear attempt to allow exactly the kind of 
structural generality we need in a general purpose music representation language. 
However, I find myself asking if there is not a flavour of the ad hoc, since the 
combination operators seem to be hard-wired into the language, rather than being 
fully user-definable, as one would want; I am not sure whether this is an artifact 
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of the explanation (which is refreshingly succinct) or a feature of its subject. This 
paper is a satisfying report on a very necessary topic. There is no “right answer” 
to the design of a music programming language, but it is good to see a clear 
attempt to address the theoretical issues. instead of just building an obvious 
solution to a particular problem. 
“On Analyzing and Representing Musical Rhythm”, by Christiane Linster, is 
not about rhythm perception-or at least not about aural rhythm perception, as 
one might expect from its section heading. Rather, the paper outlines some 
experiments carried out with a three-layer feed-forward neural network, trained 
by error-backpropagation, which is used to learn and then recognise simple 
rhythmic patterns. The reason this is not an emulation of aural rhythm perception 
is that the input to the network is “time-normalised”-that is, exact note values 
according to a constant pulse are represented, rather than the reality of a 
performed rhythm, so the input is more like a representation of a score. 
Furthermore, the events are presented in parallel, rather than sequentially, as is 
the case in the ear of a listener, and note values are abstracted away-only onset 
times are given. Indeed, in the conclusion, Linster comments that she is “aware of 
the simplifications , especially the lack of temporal information” [p. 4261. But 
analysing rhythm after abstracting away the temporal information seems rather an 
odd thing to do. 
Linster has used large numbers of training examples from two respectable 
corpora of data: the Mozart piano sonatas, and parts of Hindemith’s clarinet 
sonata. The criterion for success was to recognise rhythmic groupings which 
accorded with the original notation. In the first case, 90% success is reported; in 
the second, however, the result was just 10%. This, Linster tells us, was due to 
the variety of rhythms in the training examples. Oddly, Linster does not seem 
bothered by the fact that, while her system copes well with what are, in context, 
most predictable rhythms. it breaks down as soon as anything other than a 
straightforward case appears-triplets being the first point at which recognition of 
regular rhythm becomes really interesting. Also, it is not always the case that the 
notation of a piece corresponds with the generally perceived rhythm: so we are 
definitely not talking about perception here. There is a danger of ad hoc results 
too, since the system takes input only in the form of short phrases, and it seems 
likely that boundary conditions will be significant. (Linster makes no comment 
about the size of her array of inputs; perhaps it is intended to simulate the extent 
of memory during listening.) This may raise problems when dealing with, for 
example, anacrusis (when a rhythmic group does not begin on a strong beat). 
Here, then, is an example where a chosen representation can really affect the 
results of an analysis. 
Of course, representation will always be fundamental to AI work, and it is very 
often the case that it is necessary to discuss it in detail in order to introduce other 
topics. However, it seems to me that it is enough of an issue in music to warrant 
an explicit section of its own: above, I have presented just five possibilities. 
Further discussion of the issue can be found in many places, one survey being in 
PI. 
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4.3. Expert systems and what we want to know 
There are only two papers on work presented as expert systems in this volume, 
which I find surprising, since tasks such as (schoolbook) harmony and counter- 
point would, I would think, lend themselves well to this kind of approach. The 
contrast between the two papers is marked, and worth discussion here. 
Kemal Ebcioglu’s paper, “An Expert System for Harmonizing Chorales in the 
Style of J.S. Bach”, is a summary of some by now well-known work in logic 
programming. The expert systems part of the paper reports on the application of 
some well-established techniques to a new domain. Before I discuss this, let me 
pause for a more general comment, the subject of which is exemplified in the 
extreme here. 
In several of the papers in this book, and often elsewhere, there is what seems 
to be a confusion, or at least a lack of distinction, between the theory and the 
implementation of AI systems. This is most obvious where we are told, for 
example, in the first paragraph of a section on knowledge acquisition, what 
machine and what language were used to build an experimental system and how 
fast it ran-before we are told how it works or even what it does. Surely, in 
Cognitive Musicology, we should be less interested in the program itself, than in 
how effectively the theory embodied therein models some observed musical 
behaviour. (Having said this, I should comment that it is sometimes helpful to 
explain a theory by describing a system, as do Be1 and Kippen, in this volume, so 
long as the distinction is made clear.) A related issue is the tendency, when faced 
with a problem, to design and implement a programming language specially to 
solve it. 
A combination of both of these has disastrously compromised Ebcioglu’s paper. 
The paper is 39 pages long, the last 14 containing a discussion of issues involved 
mostly with the methodology of eliciting and representing musical knowledge in 
this system and in expert systems in general. The rest of the paper is devoted to a 
detailed discussion of a particular logic programming language designed to 
support “intelligent backtracking” for control of this particular search space. In 
the context of cognitive musicology, this information is simply irrelevant, as is 
how fast the program runs on an IBM 3081. We need to understand the notions 
used for the intelligent backtracking in terms of traversal of an abstract search 
space and that is all-especially since the mechanism used is fairly straight- 
forward. As for “benchmarks” in terms of time taken on a particular machine: 
this is quite irrelevant. What we want is some idea of the computational 
complexity of the operations performed, so that we can see how difficult large- 
scale use of the theory is likely to be. (For example, Be1 and Kippen give us such 
an analysis, in the context of their tiny Apple IIc, use of which was directly 
relevant to their experimental technique.) In circumstances where there are no 
experimental restrictions, why should we care about the time taken running a 
particular implementation on an old-fashioned computer? 
To return to the expert systems part of his paper: Ebcioglu discusses some 
problems with building up a knowledge base, which seem likely to be issues where 
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the emulation of any human “artistic” ability is involved. He explains that it is not 
enough to have hard constraints on the search space for an acceptable harmonisa- 
tion of a chorale, as this does not guide the search sufficiently to come up with a 
“good” chorale-we might paraphrase this by saying that we need taste as well as 
technique. Equally, it has not proven possible to give heuristics and/or constraints 
that will capture the style of the chosen composer exactly, because the data are 
not always consistent. For both constraints and heuristics, Ebcioglu explains at 
some length that good sources of data are existing treatises, or examination of the 
existing corpus of music, which seem rather obvious. I also feel that the page-long 
description of the horizon effect, and proposal of the standard solution of a 
high-level plan to overcome it, is out of place-and to confirm that the questions 
and answers in this expert system are just the same as those in any other. In that 
case, I find myself asking: why is Ebcioglu forced to compromise in his 
characterisation of the style of Bach? It seems that the really interesting task here 
is to examine what kinds of information the standard techniques do not capture, 
and why. These points, however, are not addressed. 
The most interesting section of the paper is to be found at the end, where 
Ebcioglu touches on the suggestion that automatically composed music is 
necessarily devoid of “emotional content”. He suggests that it is not so but that 
the “emotion” contained in it must be encoded in the rules by the knowledge 
engineer. Regrettably, what would have made a controversial and fascinating 
topic for a whole section in this volume is relegated to half a page, leaving the 
paper almost devoid of any real relevant contribution in this context. 
“An Expert System for Harmonic Analysis of Tonal Music”, by H.J. Maxwell, 
is a chapter of this book that Kemal Ebcioglu would do well to read. However, I 
assume neither he nor the other editors (proof-)read this paper, since all the 
musical examples appear twice, which seems excessive. Nevertheless, here is a 
clear and straightforward report of an interesting and useful piece of work. 
Maxwell describes a rule-based expert system for the analysis of tonal music- 
though, strictly, his data is only from the baroque period, taken from the Bach 
French Suites. Almost all of the 55 rules in the system are given in the paper, 
stated in terse, comprehensible English; and there is a helpful high-level running 
commentary. 
The system works by approximating some of the features one feels oneself to be 
using in musical analysis: key centre and strong beat are primary. A particularly 
satisfying aspect of the work is the attempt to characterise notions of “conso- 
nance” and “dissonance” independently of key, but in terms of abstract harmonic 
structure; this allows for an effective interplay between the rules analysing key 
centre and those following harmonic progression within it. The results for the 
examples given are convincing, and Maxwell gives a detailed and honest analysis 
of the shortcomings and successes of the experiments. I would be interested to 
know how well the system performed on other pieces, in the intended style and in 
others. In particular, it would be useful to test out the rules in musics where one 
or other of the primary parameters was less clearly defined-for example, in 
Renaissance polyphony, where the notion of beat strength is much less obvious. 
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The possibilities of generating harmony from the same rules is also worthy of 
exploration. 
4.4. Music and language 
I confess that I approach this subject with not a little trepidation; it is a 
philosophical minefield, which is hemmed in with dogmatic assumptions against 
which it can be hard to argue. However, in the light of Minsky’s contribution to 
the Foreword and of David Cope’s paper, “On the Algorithmic Representation of 
Musical Style”, I feel that I cannot avoid it. I have already expressed my worries 
about the Foreword in general terms. In Cope’s paper, none of the basic issues 
(nature and purpose of communication, utility and usage of language and music, 
and what language and music actually are) is discussed. Rather, it starts from a 
simple written English sentence. An analogy is drawn between this and a simple 
musical phrase notated in a score. The idea is that one can (allegedly) remove 
parts of the English sentence and still be left with more or less of the original 
meaning, and that this gives us an idea of the significance of each word; the 
analogy, then, is that the same can be done with the musical phrase under, for 
example, Schenkerian analysis [7]. (The fact that many English sentences cannot 
be understood as a whole without a surrounding context is left aside.) The rather 
convoluted inference drawn from this, is that it is possible (partially) to encode 
the syntactic structure of both English and music in the form of a grammar. This 
is nothing particularly new, [2] being one of many approaches to describing 
musical structure in this way. The hard part comes when we try to relate 
“meaning” between music (or indeed any other structure describable by gram- 
mar, such as architecture [5]) and human language. In language, we have a 
general consensus amongst users as to what the words mean, and how they refer 
to and describe the shared context in which the users live. However, in music, 
there is no such consensus-and it is important here to note the distinction 
between the sharing that takes place, in, for example, stylistic connotations, like 
those appealed to by Beethoven’s Pastoral Symphony, and any “meaning” or 
“reference” which might be inferred directly from the music itself. 
My worry about this work, as with the Foreword, is that it is taken for granted 
that linguistic terms and concepts carry over to music. For example, “Explicit 
meanings are given to each of the symbols . . .” which “creates an expression or 
interpretation” of the piece being analysed or generated [pp. 359ff]. We are not 
told what these meanings actually are, nor to which musical entities they are 
attached. Nor are we told how they combine to give “meaning” to compound 
structures. I can only guess that these are actually not meanings in the usual sense 
of linguistic semantics at all. Maybe they are higher-level, coarser-grained 
syntactic information-at the structural level of a cadence, for example, as 
opposed to that of a chord; or maybe they are semiotic analyses. It is clear, 
however, that the use of the concept of meaning here is ill-defined and abused. 
For example, in comparing the data, we are told that the “C-major quality” of the 
music example “possesses as much information as did the equally simple” English 
sentence. Cope does not rcfcr to Information theory; outside that context, 1 
simp1v do not knc~u what this is supposed to mean. 
The!-e are othct worries hcrc too. Cope discusses the use of a parser/generator 
formalism for hi\ nru~ic. and state?: that he needs the power of an ATN to capture 
(for example) srrnplc intra--phrase person and number agreement, which is not 
corrcc‘r~~-an KTN will do. (1 agree that the unbounded dependencies in music 
need more than K’I‘N power. but this is not an example of why.) The linguistic 
examples given arc convoluted and difficult to understand, and it seems that their 
grounding in the linguistic field ih not ah strong as it might be. 
(‘opt finishes the paper with an example generated by his system: a fairly 
convincing two-part invention in traditional Western tonal style. The disappoint- 
ment for me is that this one example is presented as “substantial” evidence that 
“music ih a language”. When it is far from clear even what “language” is meant to 
mean. one example really does not constitute an argument for that claim. There is 
insufticicnt detail in the paper to suggest that it is intended merely to be a report 
on the implementation. so I a111 left wondering exactly what it is meant to tell me. 
So where doe:, this leave us’.’ It is clear that in order to discuss this issue fully, 
wc need precise definition4 of what a language is. and what we expect to do with 
it. I suggest that one of the dcfinin g features of a human language, used for 
communicating, like English. is the abilitv to refer to entities in the real world as 
percei\ctl by users. .41so. there should. bc some consensus of connotation of 
words: that i5, an agreement between users as to what words refer to and what 
relationships bctwccn referents they specify. This suggests that. if only for reasons 
of efficiency. there is likely to bc some morphology in a language, so that stems 
can indicate basic mcaninps and inflections modify them. None of these features, 
it seems to me, is generally present in music. Also, and perhaps most importantly. 
I tic1 it is appropriate to ask the question: <‘Why should there be (linguistic-style) 
nieanin~ iii music?‘. Wh) should WC not view musical experience as abstract 
processzs which result in physical and maybe emotional stimuli‘? It is not desirable 
that different musical “scntenccs” can mean different things to different people? I 
can only conclude by suggesting that in cases such as this, in the absence of any 
clear- cvidcnce at all. it is much better at first to make weak assumptions (viz., no 
meaning) than strong ones (viz.. meaning). unless one is attempting to test out 
the assumption itself:. that way. any garden path up which we may be led is likely 
to bc shorter and less slipper!, 
5. Cunclusion 
it i4 hard to draw unifornl conclusions from all this. There is some very 
interesting work here. presented effectively; but it is mixed with papers of lower 
quality. Perhaps most importantly. I do not think that this book represents the 
field as a whole particularly clearly. and I have to say that. if I had paid for my 
copy. I would be unhapp!. It probably would make a useful contribution to a 
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reference library, but the misleading section headings which I mentioned above 
will certainly cause some frustration and wasted time. 
Had I been editing this volume, I might have been inclined to do things 
differently-asking some authors to rewrite their papers into a form better suited 
to this archival publication, and omitting some of the papers, in particular those 
already available elsewhere. While these steps would have taken more work on 
the authors’ and editors’ part, they would certainly have been worthwhile, as 
would have been more care in the editing: as it is, the book cannot be said do 
justice to its contributors. 
As for the implications for the field-I am not sure that there are any. As I said 
above, there is much more of the field than is or can be represented here, some 
stronger, some weaker. I suppose one might say that a collection like this which is 
non-positive is necessarily negative. I can only hope that this is not the case, 
since, to my mind, there is lots more interesting work to be done in the area. 
Further, that work is very likely to feed insight back into the wider world of AI, 
particularly in those areas of knowledge representation and the philosophy and 
nature of communication on which I have but touched above. 
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